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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Can a buffer holding only 1.2 seconds of digital content constitute copyright 
infringement?  The resolution depends upon how one interprets the Copyright 
Act.  To warrant copyright protection under the statute, a work must be in the 
form of a copy and that copy needs to be fixed.1  Section II of this paper explores 
the varied and conflicting interpretations of these defined terms beginning with 
the legislative process that led to the Copyright Act’s enactment and subsequent 
readings by commissions.  Two distinct viewpoints hinge upon when, or if, a copy 
has been fixed.  Congressional intent has been interpreted to require two elements 
for a copy to be fixed: (1) the work must be embodied in a copy and (2) that copy 
must satisfy a temporal requirement to be something more than transitory.2  
National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works 
(CONTU) brought confusion to the temporal requirement of the Copyright Act by 
stating that a work has been copied once it has been placed in a computer.3 
Section III covers judicial interpretations that established and shaped the 
RAM copy doctrine, which views every transfer of a work into the volatile 
temporary memory of a computer as making a copy for copyright purposes.  This 
concept finds, if not its origin, at least, its epicenter, in the holding of the Ninth 
Circuit in MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.4  Subsequently, other courts and 
districts have largely espoused this holding until recently.  Moreover, the holding 
that established the RAM copy doctrine has had support from scholars and was 
adopted by the Clinton Administration’s National Information Infrastructure (NII) 
working group.5 
As digital technology and networks continue to replace analog models, courts 
have questioned the RAM copy doctrine.  The judicial decisions of the federal 
district court and the court of appeals in the Cablevision cases highlight this 
                                                                                                                                     
1 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
2 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 53 (1976). 
3 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL 
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 
22 (1978), available at http://digital-law-online.info/CONTU/PDF/index.html [hereinafter 
CONTU Report]. 
4 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993) (affirming the district court’s holding that a copy is 
produced when a computer program is transferred from the permanent storage device to a 
computer’s RAM).  
5 See generally BRUCE A. LEHMAN, INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF 
THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (1995) (discussing how high-speed, 
high-capacity electronic information systems will change the way people and businesses handle 
and understand copyright issues). 
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tension.  In Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp. 
(Cablevision I),6 the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York 
followed the precedent of the MAI Sys. Corp. case in holding that portions of 
programming temporarily stored in buffer memory during operation of the cable 
television provider’s Remote Storage Digital Video Recorder (RS-DVR) service 
constitute copies and violated the plaintiffs’—content providers’—reproduction 
right.7  However, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Cablevision I 
decision a year later.8  The Court held that digital media present in the buffers did 
not qualify as copies under the Copyright Act because the data was not fixed for 
more than a “transitory duration,” and therefore, fell short of the temporal 
requirement.9  The Court noted that the district court’s reliance on cases such as 
MAI Sys. Corp. was “misplaced.”10  Notably, a subsequent case heard by the 
District Court for the Southern District of New York applied both the embodiment 
and temporal requirements as stated by the court of appeals in Cablevision II to 
resolve facts similar to those in MAI Sys. Corp.11 
Section IV discusses the implications of recognizing a temporal requirement 
for digital media.  Without a temporal component of fixation, copyright 
owners’ rights would be greatly expanded as a result of the functionality of 
digital technology and devices.  Applying both an embodiment and durational 
requirement aligns itself more closely with the language of the Copyright Act and 
harmonizes the statute with judicial precedent to promote the purpose of the 
Copyright Act in making creative works available to the public. 
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
The Copyright Act grants the copyright owner exclusive rights with regard to 
the copyrighted work.12  These rights include the reproduction right allowing the 
copyright holder to make “copies.”13  The Act defines copies as  
                                                                                                                                     
6 478 F. Supp. 2d 607 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) rev’d in part, vacated in part sub nom., Cartoon 
Network, L.P. v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision II), 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008). 
7 Id. at 621–22. 
8 Cartoon Network L.P. v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision II), 536 F.3d 121, 140 (2d Cir. 
2008), cert. denied, Cable News Network, Inc. v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision III) 129 S. Ct. 
985 (2009). 
9 Id. at 126. 
10 Id. (stating that unlike here, the duration requirement was not at issue in MAI Sys. Corp.). 
11 See SimplexGrinnell LP v. Integrated Sys. & Power, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 2d 167, 188–89 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (stating that a work must be embodied in a medium and must remain thus 
embodied for a period of more than a transitory duration; further stating that the embodiment 
requirement is satisfied when a software program is loaded into a computer’s RAM). 
12 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (listing the exclusive rights provided under copyright law). 
13 Id. § 106(1). 
3
Foley: Buffering and the Reproduction Right: When is a Copy a Copy?
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2010
[1:99 2010] CYBARIS™, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW 102 
[M]aterial objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is 
fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from 
which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or 
device.  The term “copies” includes the material object, other than 
a phonorecord, in which the work is first fixed.14 
Furthermore, “[a] work is fixed in a tangible medium of expression when its 
embodiment in a copy . . . by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently 
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.”15 
The 1976 Act was the first incarnation of the copyright statute to include the 
definition of copy.16  The legislative history of the Act describes the role of copy 
and fixation with regard to the copyrightable work: 
[A] “book” is not a work of authorship, but is a particular kind of 
“copy.”  Instead, the author may write a “literary work,” which in 
turn can be embodied in a wide range of “copies” . . . including 
books, periodicals, computer punch cards, microfilm, tape 
recordings, and so forth.  It is possible to have an “original work of 
authorship” without having a “copy” . . . embodying it, and it is 
also possible to have a “copy” . . . embodying something that does 
not qualify as an “original work of authorship.”  Two essential 
elements—original work and tangible object—must merge through 
fixation in order to produce subject matter copyrightable under the 
statute.17       
The definition of copy distinguishes between the intangible intellectual property 
and the material object that embodies the original work of authorship.18 
Infringement of the reproduction right occurs when one makes an 
unauthorized copy.19  The copy must be material and have some permanence to 
meet the fixation requirement.20  To prevail, the copyright holder must show that 
the copy has been incorporated in a “material object” which can be “perceived, 
                                                                                                                                     
14 Id. § 101 (emphasis added). 
15 Id. § 101 (emphasis added). 
16 3 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 9:62 (2010) (stating that the 1976 Act is the 
first Copyright Act to define copy). 
17 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1479, at 53 (1976). 
18 See PATRY, supra note 16, at § 9:62. 
19 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1), 501(a) (2006). 
20 See 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.02[B][2], at 8-
31 (2009). 
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reproduced, or communicated,” and is sufficiently permanent or stable “for a 
period of more than transitory duration.”21  Two qualifications circumscribe 
fixation: (1) the “perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated” test, and (2) 
a limitation clause, which excludes representations that last for a fleeting amount 
of time, falling short of the “period of more than transitory duration.”22 
The legislative history of the Copyright Act also illustrates the congressional 
intent to require fixation to last for a period of time: “[T]he definition of ‘fixation’ 
would exclude from the concept purely evanescent or transient reproductions such 
as those projected briefly on a screen, shown electronically on a television or 
other cathode ray tube, or captured momentarily in the ‘memory’ of a 
computer.”23  The limitation clause within the Copyright Act’s definition of fixed 
imposes a quantitative-temporal restriction—more than transitory duration.24  The 
quantitative restriction measures the length of a signal’s representation in time 
units.25  Yet, Congress did not draw the line between the exact minimum duration 
that would be a fixation and one that would be too short.26 
However, the clear congressional language that imposed a temporal 
requirement for a copy to be fixed quickly became unclear.  To determine what 
protections should be afforded to computer software, Congress, in conjunction 
with the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act, created CONTU.27  The commission 
recommended (in a report known as the CONTU Report) that software and 
programs to the extent they represent original works of authorship are the “proper 
                                                                                                                                     
21 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 20, at 8-31 to -32.  The 
treatise states:  
In order to constitute an infringing copy or phonorecord, the embodiment of the 
plaintiff’s work must not only be tangible (a ‘material object’); it must be of 
some permanence.  These are two separable concepts, which are not necessarily 
wedded.  Writing in sand is tangible in form even if the next wave will erase it 
forever.  The image that appears on a television or theater screen is embodied in 
a material object, but is evanescent. 
 Id.; see also PATRY, supra note 16, § 9:63 (noting the “irony . . . that the definition of 
‘fixed’ has been used to render infringing acts that Congress wished to exclude from the ambit of 
the Act”). 
22 Posting of Zohar Efroni to The Stanford Law School Center for Internet and Society, 
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/node/5841 (Aug. 23, 2008, 15:04 PST). 
23 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 53 (1976). 
24 See 17 U.S.C. § 101; Efroni, supra note 22. 
25 See Efroni, supra note 22. 
26 See id. 
27 See Pub. L. No. 93-573, § 201, 88 Stat. 1873 (1974); SHELDON W. HALPERN ET AL. 
FUNDAMENTALS OF UNITED STATES INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: COPYRIGHT, PATENT, AND 
TRADEMARK 13 (Sheldon W. Halpern, Craig A. Nard & Kenneth L. Port eds., Aspen Publishers 
2d ed. 2007) (1999). 
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subject matter of copyright and that the Act protect them.”28  The report 
concurred with the House of Representative’s report that classified programs as 
literary works.29  Nevertheless, the report caused confusion regarding the 
temporal requirement inherent in the congressional interpretation of fixation: 
                                                                                                                                    
The text of the new copyright law makes it clear that the placement 
of a copyrighted work into a computer—or in the jargon of the 
trade, the “inputting” of it—is the preparation of a copy.  This may 
be ascertained by reading together the definitions of copies and 
fixed found in section 101 . . . Because works in computer storage 
may be repeatedly reproduced, they are fixed and, therefore, are 
copies.30 
The CONTU drafters attempted to limit the temporal requirement of fixation.31  
Where the House of Representatives sought to have it as an independent condition 
required for fixation, CONTU members arguably interpreted fixation to be 
satisfied solely by a copy’s ability to be “perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated.”32 
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 
A. RAM Copy Doctrine 
The random access memory (RAM) copy doctrine emerged from the 
legislative history and subsequent judicial application.33  The doctrine stands for 
the questionable notion that every transfer of a work into the volatile temporary 
memory of a computer makes a copy for copyright purposes.34  As a result, every 
use of a work in digital form involves the making of numerous copies.35  With its 
 
28 CONTU REPORT, supra note 3, at 1. 
29 See id. at 16; HALPERN, supra note 27. 
30 CONTU REPORT, supra note 3, at 22. “Insofar as a contrary conclusion is suggested in one 
report accompanying the new law, this should be regarded as incorrect and should not be 
followed, since legislative history need not be perused in the construction of an unambiguous 
statute.” Id. at 22 n. 111.  
31 See Efroni, supra note 22. 
32 See id.; 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
33 See Niels Schaumann, Copyright Infringement and Peer-to-Peer Technology, 28 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 1001, 1026 n.100 (2002) (discussing the history of the RAM copy doctrine); 
PATRY, supra note 16, §§ 3:24, 9:63; Efroni, supra note 22; see generally Mark A. Lemley, 
Dealing with Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 547 (1997) 
(discussing the issue of RAM copies and fixation). 
34 See Schaumann, supra note 33. 
35 See Stenograph L.L.C. v. Bossard Assocs., Inc., 144 F.3d 96, 101–02 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
(citing MAI Sys. Corp v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993)). 
6
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decision in MAI Sys. Corp., the Ninth Circuit cemented the RAM copy doctrine in 
a brief, but enduring statement: 
Peak argues that this loading of copyrighted software does not 
constitute a copyright violation because the “copy” created in 
RAM is not “fixed.”  However, by showing that Peak loads 
software into RAM and is then able to view the system error log 
and diagnose the problem with the computer, MAI has adequately 
shown that the representation created in the RAM is “sufficiently 
permanent or stable to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.36 
Previously, it was unclear if loading a copyrightable RAM copy constituted 
infringement.37  Before MAI Sys. Corp., a district court case in Illinois held that 
loading a file into a computer’s memory constitutes copying.38  The sources used 
by the court arguably provide unclear support for its decision that a RAM copy 
suffices to violate the copyright holder’s reproduction right.  When the CONTU 
Report was written the term “memory” could refer to any type of computer 
storage, both volatile (RAM) and non-volatile (hard disk).39  Because the CONTU 
Report recommended amending § 117 to permit the rightful possessor of 
computer software to copy or adapt it as “an essential step” in using the software, 
the CONTU Report can be seen as referring to disk storage.40 
Despite this lack of clarity, the Ninth Circuit drew a definitive line in its 
holding that loading software into RAM constitutes a copy.  Since MAI Sys. 
Corp., the RAM copy doctrine has been uncritically accepted in a series of lower 
court cases.41  Shortly after MAI Sys. Corp. was decided, Advanced Computer 
                                                                                                                                     
36 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993). 
37 See Apple Computer v. Formula Int’l, 594 F. Supp. 617, 622 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (stating 
copies stored in RAM are merely “temporary,” unlike ROM copies); Vault Corp. v. Quaid 
Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 261 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding defendant was not liable for 
infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1980)). 
38 See ISC-Bunker Ramo Corp. v. Altech Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1310, 1332 (N.D. Ill. 1990) 
(citing 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 20, § 8.08 (1989) for the court’s decision, stating 
“[l]oading a computer’s memory requires ‘copying’ of the program from a disk into memory, and 
that copy is a direct infringement of the copyright”).  In turn, the NIMMER treatise relied on the 
language of the CONTU REPORT.  CONTU REPORT, supra note 3; see also MicroSparc v. 
Amtype, 592 F. Supp. 33, 35 (D. Mass. 1984). 
39 See Schaumann, supra note 33. 
40 See CONTU REPORT, supra note 3, at 12–13. 
41 See generally Stenograph L.L.C. v. Bossard Assocs., Inc., 144 F.3d 96, 101–02 (D.C. Cir. 
1998); DSC Commc’ns Corp. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 81 F.3d 597, 600 (5th Cir. 1996); Triad Sys. 
Corp. v. Se. Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1333–34 (9th Cir. 1995) overruled on other grounds by 
Gonzales v. Texaco Inc., 344 Fed. Appx. 304, 306 (9th Cir. 2009); NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-
America, Inc., 45 F.3d 231, 235 (7th Cir. 1995); PracticeWorks, Inc. v. Prof’l Software Solutions 
7
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Services of Michigan, Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp. discussed fixation in RAM, and 
observed, “the Act does not require absolute permanence for the creation of a 
copy.”42  The court held that once the program is transferred to RAM, useful 
representations of the program can be displayed or printed out almost 
instantaneously.43  As a result, the program residing in RAM is stable enough to 
be a fixed copy.44  Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se. Express Co. upheld the precedent 
established in MAI Sys. Corp., holding that electronic representations of digital 
signals on a memory component that lasted for a millisecond were fixed: 
[T]he copyright law is not so much concerned with temporal 
“duration” of a copy as it is with what the copy does, and what it is 
capable of doing, while it exists.  “Transitory duration” is a relative 
term that must be interpreted and applied in context.  This concept 
is particularly important in cases involving computer technology 
where the speed and complexity of machines and software is 
rapidly advancing, and where the diversity of computer 
architecture and software design is expanding at an ever-increasing 
rate.45 
Most decisions have not engaged in a critical examination of the RAM copy 
doctrine and its meaning.  In fact, the RAM copy doctrine as set forth in MAI Sys. 
Corp. has become a mainstream judicial trend, leaving an “unequivocal and 
irremovable imprint on case law.”46  No decision challenged the RAM copy 
                                                                                                                                     
of Ill., Inc., No. Civ. JMF-02-1205, Civ. JFM-02-1206, 2004 WL 1429955, at *5 (D. Md. June 23, 
2004); Lowry’s Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 737, 745 (D. Md. 2003); 
Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1294 (D. Utah 
1999); Wilcom Pty. Ltd. v. Endless Visions, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1031 (E.D. Mich. 1998), aff’d, 
No. 99-1823, 2000 WL 1256901 (6th Cir. July 11, 2000); Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National Ass’n of 
Fire Equip. Distribs., 983 F. Supp. 1167, 1177–78 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Tricom, Inc. v. Elec. Data Sys. 
Corp., 902 F. Supp. 741, 745 (E.D. Mich. 1995); Bell Atl. Sys. Servs., Inc. v. Hitachi Data Sys. 
Corp., No. C 93-20079 JW, 1995 WL 836331, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 1995); In re Indep. Serv. 
Org. Antitrust Litig., 910 F. Supp. 1537, 1541 (D. Kan. 1995); Advanced Computer Servs. of 
Mich., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 363 (E.D. Va. 1994). 
42 845 F. Supp. 356, 363 (E.D. Va. 1994). 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Efroni, supra note 22.  
46 Efroni, supra note 22; see also Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the “Information 
Superhighway”: Authors, Exploiters, and Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1466, 
1476 n.39 (1995) (noting the judicial acceptance of the rule that electronic distribution entails the 
making of copies; however pointing out that several commentators have questioned this 
proposition). 
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doctrine for approximately 15 years,47 and the government’s NII White Paper 
Report endorsed the MAI Sys. Corp.  approach as settled law.48 
Despite the Ninth Circuit’s widely espoused RAM copy doctrine, the doctrine 
has not escaped criticism.  Critics highlight that the MAI Sys. Corp. court did not 
refer to the legislative history, it did not discuss the “transitory duration” prong of 
the fixation test, and the sources it cited are inapplicable.49  In addition, some 
cases deriving from the MAI Sys. Corp. holding distinguish between RAM copies 
that last for a period of time where a user can interface with the program and 
implicating the reproduction right from those instantaneous and incidental copies 
that are necessary to the functionality of a digital network.50  A tension exists in 
courts applying the MAI Sys. Corp. holding regarding RAM data as constituting a 
copy.51  This friction arises from determining at what point a work in a digital 
network is fixed.  Some cases that have adopted this holding do not apply the 
durational requirement within the Copyright Act’s definition of “fixed.”52  Yet, 
                                                                                                                                     
47 See Efroni, supra note 22.  
48 See LEHMAN, supra note 5, at 64–66. 
49 See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 33, at 551 n.24 (stating that despite the court’s own 
acknowledgment, its decision relied upon 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 20, § 8.08, which 
cited the CONTU REPORT, supra note 3, that referred to inputting data into permanent computer 
memory, not to the automatic generation of RAM copies).  The court also cited Vault Corp v. 
Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 260 (5th Cir. 1988), which was unclear as to whether the case 
referred to loading a copy into RAM or into the internal hard drive of a computer. 
50 See Advanced Computer Servs. of Mich., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 363 
(E.D. Va. 1994) (suggesting a middle ground where copies that exist for several minutes fall 
within the scope of the Act); David L. Hayes, Advanced Copyright Issues on the Internet, 7 TEX. 
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 8 (1998) (highlighting the Advanced Computer Servs. of Mich., Inc. opinion 
in discussing whether MAI Sys. Corp. should apply to works stored in RAM for transitory periods 
during transmission through the Internet); James V. Mahon, Note and Comment, A Commentary 
on Proposals for Copyright Protection on the National Information Infrastructure an Analysis of 
Proposed Copyright Changes and their Impact on Copyright’s Public Benefits, 22 RUTGERS 
COMPUTER & TECH L.J. 233, 241–42 (1996) (arguing that Advanced Computer Servs. of Mich., 
Inc. provides dubious authority for fixation in many instances of temporary copies made in 
computer networks). 
51 See Jonathan Band & Jeny Marcinko, A New Perspective on Temporary Copies: The 
Fourth Circuit’s Opinion in CoStar v. Loopnet, 2005 STAN. TECH. L. REV. P1, 1 (2005) (“The 
issue whether loading a program into a computer’s RAM constitutes a ‘copy’ of that program has 
been debated for almost three decades.”). 
52 See, e.g., Marobie-FL, Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Fire Equip. Distrib., 983 F. Supp. 1167, 1177–
78 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding that a copyrighted work held momentarily in a RAM buffer that was 
immediately transmitted from a host computer to the Internet was a fixed copy). 
9
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others have interpreted MAI Sys. Corp. as requiring the RAM copy to last for 
more than a “transitory duration.”53 
B. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp. (Cablevision I)54 
The holding in Cablevision I comports with the established interpretation of 
the RAM copy doctrine and its precedential weight as established by various 
courts.55  The court held that portions of programming temporarily stored in 
buffer memory during operation of the cable television provider’s Remote Storage 
Digital Video Recorder (RS-DVR) constitute copies and violate the plaintiffs’—
content providers’—reproduction right.56 
In Cablevision I, the plaintiffs provided copyrighted television 
programming,57 and the defendants owned and operated cable television systems 
in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut.58  Offered as an alternative to set-top 
DVR in the customer’s home that records directly to a hard disk in the unit’s box, 
Cablevision’s RS-DVR would store recorded programming remotely on computer 
servers at a central facility (head-end) that houses much of the software and 
hardware needed to operate the digital cable system.59  The customer would use 
her remote control and cable box to select, record, view, store, and delete 
                                                                                                                                     
53 See, e.g., CoStar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550–51 (4th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that an Internet Service Provider does not create fixed copies by providing a hosting 
service that makes temporary RAM copies).  
When an electronic infrastructure is designed and managed as a conduit of 
information and data that connects users over the Internet, the owner and 
manager of the conduit hardly ‘copies’ the information and data in the sense that 
it fixes a copy in its system of more than transitory duration. Even if the 
information and data are ‘downloaded’ onto the owner’s RAM or other 
component as part of the transmission function, that downloading is a 
temporary, automatic response to the user’s request . . . . While temporary 
electronic copies may be made in this transmission process, they would appear 
not to be ‘fixed’ in the sense that they are ‘of more than transitory duration’ . . . .  
 Id. 
54 478 F. Supp. 2d 607 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), rev’d in part, vacated in part sub nom, Cartoon 
Network, L.P. v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision II), 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008).  
55 See supra note 41 (listing MAI Sys. Corp. progeny decisions). 
56 See Cablevision I, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 622. 
57 Id. at 609–10 (Plaintiffs are The Cartoon Network LP, LLLP; Cable News Network LP, 
LLLP; Turner Broadcasting System, Inc.; Turner Network Sales, Inc.; Turner Classic Movies, LP, 
LLLP; Turner Network Television LP, LLLP; Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation; 
Universal City Studios Productions LLLP; Paramount Pictures Corporation; Disney Enterprises, 
Inc.; CBS Broadcasting Companies, Inc.; and NBC Studios, Inc.).  
58 Id. at 610 (Defendants are Cablevision and CSC [Holdings, Inc.]).  
59 Id. at 610, 612. 
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programs that are included in her cable subscription that would then be stored on 
servers at the cable provider’s facilities.60 
The court provided a detailed description of RS-DVR technology.  
Cablevision collects all the digital feeds for its linear broadcasting into an 
aggregated programming stream (APS).61  For its RS-DVR service, the cable 
provider splits the APS stream into two with the second stream going through a 
router, which places a portion of the streamed programming into buffer 
memory.62  Digital devices use a form of RAM memory called transient data 
buffers, which are regions that temporarily hold data.63  Before customers select 
programming, Cablevision buffers the content at two points.  The Big Broadband 
Multimedia Router (BMR) is the first buffering that occurs in RS-DVR.64  
Afterwards, the router divides the APS into single streams and feeds them into the 
Arroyo severs where the RS-DVR programming is recorded and stored.65  The 
servers receive these streams through the primary ingest buffer that can hold three 
frames of video from each of the linear channels carried by Cablevision.66  Each 
packet of information is stored in the buffer for up to a tenth of a second.67  Three 
frames of video equal 6,000 packets.68  Portions of programming are copied to the 
BMR and primary ingest buffer regardless of whether any cable subscriber 
requested a particular program.69 
Plaintiffs alleged that Cablevision’s RS-DVR produces unauthorized copies 
and violates their right to reproduce the work.70  Unauthorized copies are made 
when a customer requests a program and it is stored on Cablevision’s servers, and 
when portions of the program are temporarily stored in the buffer memory of the 
servers.71  Cablevision argued that the buffer copies were not fixed and are de 
minimis, but the court determined that the data in the buffer memory satisfied the 
                                                                                                                                     
60 Id. at 612–13. 
61 Id. at 610 (citations omitted):  
Digital signals are transmitted as compressed data in the form of binary digits, or 
‘bits.’  The number of bits that can be sent in a second is known as the ‘bitrate.’  
Digital signals allow for a greater variety in television programming—because 
more signals can be transmitted in the same space—as well as interactive 
services and, often, better audio and image quality than analog television.  
62 Id. at 613. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 613–14. 
66 Id. at 614. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 615. 
70 Id. at 617; see 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2006). 
71 See Cablevision I, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 617. 
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fixation requirement.72  Material residing in buffer memory was used to make 
permanent copies of the entire program subsequently stored on the servers.73  As 
a result, the material can be reproduced and the resulting copy satisfied the 
temporal requirement of lasting for “a period of more than transitory duration.”74  
Despite the fact that the ingest buffer only holds three frames of a program at any 
time, the court reasoned that the whole program would pass through the primary 
ingest buffer.75  This countered the de minimis argument.76 
In addition to its interpretation of the language of the Copyright Act, the court 
also cited previous court decisions that have held that RAM “creates a ‘copy.’”77  
It further supported its decision by citing the United State Copyright Office 
Report on the Digital Millennium Copyright Act which concluded “that 
temporary copies of a work in RAM are generally ‘fixed’ and thus constitute 
‘copies’ within the scope of the copyright owner’s right of reproduction, so long 
as they exist for a sufficient amount of time to be capable of being copied, 
perceived, or communicated.”78  Therefore, the court found that the RS-DVR 
copied content providers’ programming in buffer memory and violated the 
plaintiffs’ reproduction right.79  The court granted the plaintiffs’ summary 
judgment motion and enjoined Cablevision from launching its RS-DVR.80 
C. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision II)81 
Cablevision appealed and the court of appeals found that buffering did not 
create copies.82  The court addressed whether Cablevision’s manipulation of the 
content through the BMR and primary ingest buffers before and without 
subscriber request reproduces the work in copies and infringes the copyright 
holders’ reproduction right.83  The primary ingest buffer holds up to 0.1 second of 
                                                                                                                                     
72 Id. at 621. 
73 Id. 
74 See id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)). 
75 Id. 
76 See id. 
77 See Schaumann, supra note 33. 
78 Cablevision I, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 621–22 (quoting U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DIGITAL 
MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1998 SECTION 104 REPORT, at 107–17 (Aug. 2001), available at 
http:// www. copyright. gov/ reports/ studies/ dmca/ dmca_ study. html [hereinafter DMCA 
REPORT]). 
79 See id. at 622. 
80 See id. at 624. 
81 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, Cable News Network, Inc. v. CSC Holdings, Inc. 
(Cablevision III), 129 S. Ct. 985 (2009). 
82 See id. at 130. 
83 See id. at 127. 
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each channel’s programming at any moment.84  Consequently, the buffer erases 
and replaces data on the buffer every tenth of a second.85  In addition, the BMR 
holds a maximum of 1.2 seconds of programming at any time.86 
In its analysis, the court of appeals first looked at the definition of “copies” 
and “fixed” in § 101 of the Copyright Act.87  To be “fixed,” the work must satisfy 
two conditions: the embodiment requirement (the work is in a medium that 
enables it to be “perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated”) and the 
duration requirement (the work’s embodiment must last for a “period of more 
than transitory duration”).88  Both requirements must be met to consider the 
material of the copyrighted work in the buffers fixed and therefore a copy of the 
original work.89 
This is the point where the court of appeals diverged from the interpretation of 
the district court.90  The district court focused primarily on the embodiment 
requirement: 
As a result of this error, once [the district court] determined that 
the buffer data was “[c]learly . . . capable of being reproduced,” 
i.e., that the work was embodied in the buffer, the district court 
concluded that the work was therefore “fixed” in the buffer, and 
that a copy had thus been made.91 
This conclusion stems from relying on MAI Sys. Corp., and the subsequent line of 
cases that established the RAM copy doctrine.92  Furthermore, the district court 
relied on the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Section 104 Report 
(DMCA Report), which the court of appeals interpreted to state that an 
embodiment is fixed “[u]nless a reproduction manifests itself so fleetingly that it 
cannot be copied.”93 
                                                                                                                                     
84 Id. at 124. 
85 Id.  Note here that the RS-DVR uses buffering technology elsewhere but the primary ingest 
and BMR are the only areas where Cablevision acts alone.  Id. at 125. 
86 Id. at 125. 
87 See id. at 127. 
88 Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 and citing 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 20, at 8-32. 
89 See id. at 127. 
90 See id. 
91 Id. (quoting Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp. (Cablevision I), 
478 F. Supp. 2d 607, 621–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) rev’d in part, vacated in part sub nom., Cartoon 
Network, L.P. v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision II), 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008). 
92 Id. (citing MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517 (9th Cir. 1993)). 
93 Id. (quoting DMCA REPORT, supra note 78, at 111). 
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The court refuted the lower court’s analysis in Cablevision I by distinguishing 
the MAI Sys. Corp. cases and marginalizing the DMCA Report.94  Generally, 
these cases concluded a copy is fixed without expressly addressing the duration 
requirement.95  However, the Cablevision II court asserted that this does not 
assume or establish that the duration requirement does not exist.96  Moreover, in 
these cases, the duration requirement was not an issue and was therefore 
distinguishable.97  The issue in MAI Sys. Corp. was whether loading software into 
the computer’s RAM created a copy as defined by the Act and this depended on 
whether the version of software present in the RAM was fixed.98  The RAM 
embodiment of the operating software constituted a copy because the technician 
was able to view the system’s error log and diagnose the problem.99  In 
Cablevision II, the court surmised that the parties did not litigate the duration 
requirement.100  Besides, the court assumed this analysis of duration was not 
necessary in the line of RAM copy doctrine cases because the “program was 
embodied in RAM for at least several minutes.”101  As a result, duration analysis 
was not needed and the reasoning is not dispositive to the facts present here: 
[W]e construe MAI Systems and its progeny as holding that loading 
a program into a computer’s RAM can result in copying that 
program.  We do not read MAI Systems as holding that, as a matter 
of law, loading a program into a form of RAM always results in 
copying.  Such a holding would read the “transitory duration” 
language out of the definition, and we do not believe our sister 
circuit would dismiss the statutory language without even 
discussing it.  It appears the parties in MAI Systems simply did not 
dispute that the duration requirement was satisfied; this line of 
cases simply concludes that when a program is loaded into RAM, 
the embodiment requirement is satisfied . . . .102 
Accordingly, in Cablevision II, the court distinguished the Cablevision facts from 
the facts in MAI Sys. Corp., and rendered the MAI Sys. Corp. analysis inapplicable 
to the set of facts present here.  The court held that a fixed copy must satisfy both 
                                                                                                                                     
94 See id. at 127–30. 
95 See id. at 127. 
96 See id. 
97 See id. (stating that the line of cases following MAI Sys. Corp. do not address the issues in 
Cablevision II). 
98 Id. at 127–28 (citing MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517 (9th Cir. 
1993)). 
99 Id. at 128 (citing MAI Sys. Corp., 991 F.2d at 518). 
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the embodiment and the duration requirement, and that the MAI Sys. Corp. 
analysis was not applicable.103 
Cablevision II also dispensed with the district court’s reliance upon the 
Copyright Office’s 2001 DMCA Report for finding an embodiment to be fixed 
unless the reproduction is so fleeting that it cannot be “copied, perceived, or 
reproduced.”104  Further adding that the DMCA Report does not expressly state 
that fixation does not have a temporal aspect.105  However, the durational 
prerequisite appears to be limited in the report because if the work can be copied 
from that medium for any amount of time, the embodiment and duration 
requirement of fixed is met.106  The court viewed the Copyright Office’s 
interpretation as negating the duration requirement and ignoring the 
congressionally developed language of the statutory definition.107  The court did 
not refute the DMCA Report, but neutered its authoritative weight by giving it 
only Skidmore deference based on its “power to persuade.”108 
After dispensing with the sources of the district court’s holding, the court 
concluded that the definition of fixed imposes both an embodiment and a 
durational requirement.109  The court determined that the data present in the 
buffer meets the embodiment requirement “where every second of an entire work 
is placed, one second at a time.”110  However, the buffer stores data for no more 
than “a fleeting 1.2 seconds.”111  The court sees this as transitory and failing the 
duration requirement.112  Plaintiffs argued that the duration is not transitory 
because the data lasts long enough for complete reproductions to be ultimately 
copied onto the cable provider’s servers.113  The court rejected this because it 
does not account for the “more than transitory duration” language present in 
§ 101.114  The court concluded that the buffering within the RS-DVR does not 
create copies as defined by the Copyright Act because it does not satisfy the 
                                                                                                                                     
t 129. 
g DMCA REPORT, supra note 78, at 111). 
id. 
944)). 
ablevision does not dispute this point). 
id. at 130. 
103 See id. a
104 Id. (citin
105 See id. 
106 See id. 
107 See 
108 Id. (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1
109 Id. 
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5  The Solicitor General sided with the 
                                                                                                                                    
116 
Cable News Network, Inc. v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision III)117—
Petition for and subsequent denial of a writ of certiorari 
The content providers—copyright holders—appealed the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals decision in Cablevision II.118  Initially, the Supreme Court 
deferred hearing the case, inviting the Solicitor General to file a brief expressing 
the views of the United States concerning the issues in this case.119  The 
petitioners appealed all the issues raised in the lower courts, including whether the 
data in the buffers are fixed to constitute a copy as defined in § 101.120  The 
argument propounds that Cablevision II conflicts with MAI Sys. Corp. arguing 
that the facts of each case were not distinguishable.121  Under MAI Sys. Corp. and 
subsequent cases espousing the RAM copy doctrine, the petitioners contend that 
the embodiment requirement alone satisfies a copy being fixed provided the work 
lasts long enough to be perceived, reproduced, or communicated.122  The Second 
Circuit allegedly departs from precedent by imposing an independent duration 
requirement in addition to the embodiment requirement.123  Moreover, petitioners 
argue that the Second Circuit misread the statutory definition to produce its 
“outcome determinative” holding.124  Petitioners contended further that the 
Second Circuit incorrectly interpreted “embodiment” in § 101 to be qualified by 
the phrase “for a period of more than transitory duration,” where this phrase 
should have been read to modify “perc ved, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated” and not “embodiment.”12
 
r General to file brief). 
s Network also questioned 
whet ng the RS-DVR and whether 
play
Consulting, 
Inc. ossard Assocs., Inc., 144 F.3d 
96, ir. 1998); MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517–18 (9th 
Cir.  DMCA REPORT, supra note 78, at 111. 
115 See id. 
116 See id. 
117 129 S. Ct. 985 (2009) (inviting Solicito
118 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Cable News Network, Inc. v. CSC Holdings, Inc. 
(Cablevision III), 2008 WL 4484597 (Oct. 6, 2008) (No. 08-448). 
119 Cablevision III, 129 S. Ct. at 985. 
120 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 118 (Cable New
her Cablevision is directly liable for the copies made usi
back of the recorded transmissions violate the copyright holders’ public performance right 
under § 106(5)); see also Cablevision II, 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008). 
121 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 118, at *30.  
122 See id. at *31–32 (citing Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng’g & 
, 421 F.3d. 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Stenograph L.L.C. v. B
101–02 (D.C. C
 1993)); see also Ginsburg, supra note 46;
123 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 118, at *31. 
124 Id. at *32. 
125 Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)). 
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Second Circuit’s decision in Ca ately, the Supreme Court 
A. 
                                                                                                                                    
blevision II.126 Ultim
127denied the writ for a petition of certiorari.  
IV.  ANALYSIS 
The RAM Copy Doctrine Without a Temporal Component Coupled with 
Digital Functionality Would Expand the Rights of Copyright Owners. 
The nature of RAM data and digital technologies involve making multiple 
copies.  To qualify these copies as satisfying the definition of copy and fixed in 
the Copyright Act would make many activities potentially infringing in the digital 
arena.  Where an analog device processes incoming voltage pulses as a 
continuous stream, such as a sine wave with a particular amplitude and frequency, 
a digital unit takes the same incoming voltage stream, divides it into thousands of 
separate pieces (bits) and assigns a numeric value (a 1 or 0) to each segment 
based on the incoming voltage.128  Buffering stores the data because the incoming 
stream can exceed the operating speed of a computer.129  Buffering temporarily 
enables the digital device to enhance the accuracy of its reproduction of the 
incoming stream and also allows the device to combine later-arriving data with 
that which has already been received for further processing.130  All digital devices 
necessarily and automatically create temporary buffer copies to process digital 
information unlike analog transmissions.131  Traditional copyright law primarily 
 
126 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Cable News Network, Inc. v. CSC 
Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision III), 129 S. Ct. 985 (2009) (No. 08-448), 2009 WL 1511740, *5–6, 8 
not conflict with previous 
hold
-448) (Roberts, C.J., and Alito, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of 
this 
LECTRONIC COMMERCE TERMS: JUDICIAL, 
LEG
different rates at which data is 
prod
ome larger memory that are (believed to be) 
curr
., Cartoon Network, L.P. v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision II), 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 
2008
(May 29, 2009) (explaining that the Solicitor General favored the court of appeal’s decision 
because its holding recognized a duration requirement which did 
ings but merely distinguished this holding based upon the facts). 
127 Cartoon Network L.P. v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision II), 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 
2008), cert. denied, Cable News Network, Inc. v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision III), 129 S. Ct. 
985 (2009) (08
petition). 
128 See generally Per A. Holst, Analog Computer, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUTER SCIENCE 
53–59 (Anthony Ralston, et al., eds. 4th ed. 2000); Mark A. Franklin, Analog-to-Digital and 
Digital-to Analog Converters, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUTER SCIENCE, 61–62; BARRY B. 
SOOKMAN, Analog, in COMPUTER, INTERNET AND E
ISLATIVE AND TECHNICAL DEFINITIONS 6 (2003). 
129 See generally Robert W. Taylor, Buffer, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUTER SCIENCE, supra 
note 128, at 160–61 (“[A] buffer exists in order to accommodate the 
uced or consumed by the processor or peripherals involved.”). 
130 See id.; see also Alan Jay Smith, Cache Memory, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUTER 
SCIENCE, supra note 128, at 180–87 (“[A] cache memory is small, high-speed buffer memory used 
to hold temporarily those portions of the contents of s
ently in use.”); SOOKMAN, supra note 128, at 35. 
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contemplated works in tangible form where it is easy to pinpoint when a copy has 
been made.132  Coupling the nature of buffering with the previously established 
inte
                                                                                                                                    
rpretation of MAI Sys. Corp. would make all the various stages of data transfer 
within a digital framework seen as producing copyrightable copies.133 
If the functioning of digital technologies and devices makes multiple 
copyrightable copies, then the rights of the copyright owners would be enlarged 
while the user’s access and freedoms would be diminished.134  The copyright 
owner would be given the additional rights of transmission and access.135  If 
RAM copies are seen as reproductions, copyright holders’ exclusive rights would 
be enhanced and subsume an individual’s right to read, view, or listen to works in 
digital formats.136  Under this interpretation, the reproduction right has been 
expanded to an exclusive reading right because digital technology makes a copy 
 
a note 50, at 3. 
133 S
he copyright owner and which should not presents a very difficult 
 
ephe ing action is deeply rooted in the way computers work.”). 
ESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE 
IN THE H
rdinary uses trigger the copyright law—because 
[s] on whether something has been reproduced in the memory of some computer 
som
y-First Century: The Exclusive Right To Read, 
13 C  ENT. L.J. 29, 31–32 (1994). 
132 See Hayes, supr
ee id. at 101: 
Virtually every activity on the Internet--such as browsing, caching, linking, 
downloading, accessing information, and operation of an online service-involves 
the making of copies, at least if the law treats electronic images of data stored in 
RAM as copies for purposes of copyright law. In short, copying is both 
ubiquitous and inherent in the very nature of the medium. If the law were to treat 
all forms of copying as infringements of the copyright holder’s rights, then the 
copyright holder would have very strong control over Internet use of the 
copyrighted work. Which forms of copying the law should deem to be within the 
control of t
challenge. 
 See also DMCA REPORT, supra note 78, at 10; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE 
DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 28 (2000) (“[W]hen 
information is represented digitally, access inevitably means making a copy, even if only an
meral (temporary) copy.  This copy
134 See Hayes, supra note 50, at 4. 
135 See id. at 101; see also LAWRENCE L
YBRID ECONOMY 98–100 (2008): 
[E]very time you use a creative work in a digital context, the technology is 
making a copy . . .No matter what you do, your actions trigger the law of 
copyright. Every action must be justified as either licensed or ‘fair use’. . . .To 
read a book requires permission . . . All the ordinary uses of a creative work are 
now regulated because all o
again, any use is a copy . . . . 
 See also JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 179–80 (2006) (“[W]hile copyright law 
permits the owner of a copy to transfer that copy freely, the privilege does not extend to any 
transfer by electronic transmission . . . [with] the crucial distinction between lawful and unlawful 
activity . . . turn
ewhere.”). 
136 See Jessica Litman, Copyright in the Twent
ARDOZO ARTS &
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for the user to see the work.137  Although this idea has been derived from the MAI 
Sys. Corp. precedent and CONTU Report, and adopted by the NII working group, 
these sources have unclear authority for this proposition and actually contradict 
express legislative intent.138  An expanded reproduction right will subsume other 
exclusive righ 139ts such as the public display right potentially held by others.   
Con
the public in favor of content providers.  In some instances, copyright owners who 
hol
                                                                                                           
versely, an individual lawfully using a digital device would be seen as making 
copies that potentially infringe the copyright owner’s rights simply through using 
the device.140 
As a result, control over all access to information may be shifted away from 
d the reproduction right would be vested with superior rights over others who 
                          
he Controversy Over RAM “Copies,” 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 
83, le copies of a work are made by viewing the work 
online; a nerally 
allow co ut any 
recourse
140 S
 way to the endpoint. . 
ly by the recipient’s computer . . 
 S tion & 
Reprodu
ivate actions by individual consumers at 
puters would trigger a copyright owner’s prima facie right.  To 
137 See id. at 40. 
138 Id. at 40, 41 nn.55, 59–60 (stressing that the RAM copy doctrine finds support in “three 
recent cases, a stray remark in the CONTU Report, and brief discussions in a couple of recent law 
review articles”). 
139 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(5) (2006) (granting the copyright holder exclusive rights to display 
the copyrighted work publicly); see also R. Anthony Reese, The Public Display Right: The 
Copyright Act’s Neglected Solution to t
141 (2001) (highlighting the fact that multip
ccordingly “a claim of infringing reproduction by means of RAM storage will ge
pyright owners to control the use of their works over computer networks witho
 to the public display right”). 
ee Lemley, supra note 33, at 554–55:  
If one accepts the argument that RAM copies are actionable under 106(1), the 
number of copies made in even the most routine Net transactions increases 
dramatically.  Obviously, each act of uploading or downloading makes a RAM 
copy in the recipient’s computer, but that is only the beginning.  When a picture 
is downloaded from a Web site, the modem at each end will buffer each byte, as 
will the router, the receiving computer, the Web browser, the video 
decompression chip, and the video display board.  Those seven copies will be 
made on each such transaction.  Further since most Internet transmissions do not 
travel directly between sender and receiver, more copies will be made of the 
individual packets at each node they pass through on their
. .  Some [of these copies] are generated by the computer where the message 
originates . . .  [b]ut others are made automatical
. anyone who browses the Net and unintentionally runs across infringing 
material is making infringing copies under this rationale. 
ee also Wendy J. Gordon, Fine-Tuning Tasini: Privileges of Electronic Distribu
ction, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 473, 485–86 (2000).  
The practical issues here are large . . . [I]f appearance in RAM form would be 
considered a ‘reproduction,’ even pr
their home com
hold that every private person is ‘copying’ when they receive something in 
RAM may extend the copyright owners’ rights impermissibly, creating problems 
both for free speech and for privacy. 
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have copyright claims in the work, such as the public display right.141  Some 
argue that a shift in copyright interests should be dictated by policy and not the 
142
B. t, the RAM Copy Doctrine does not 
 Act, which stated that fleeting 
rep 144
technology that delivers the work.  
Without a Durational Requiremen
Comport with the Copyright Act. 
To find that buffering technologies, which can hold less than a second of 
audiovisual data, constitute copyrightable copies, rests on the assumption that 
only the embodiment requirement is needed for a copy to be fixed.  Reliance upon 
this assumption misreads the statutory language of the Copyright Act.143  This 
reasoning ignores the duration requirement of the “fixed” definition in § 101.  
Statutory construction demands that all language therein be given effect.  
Furthermore, the rationale that transient RAM copies are fixed runs contrary to 
the congressional intent regarding the 1976
roductions of information are not copies.  
                                                                                                                                     
 Id. at 485 n.65. 
141 See Reese, supra note 139, at 142, 146; LITMAN, supra note 135, at 91–92 (c aracterizing h
the MAI Sys. Corp. decision as “the watershed moment in the transition from an incentive model 
ng the [digital] work would, under this interpretation, involve an actionable 
repr




 television or theater screen is embodied in 
for more than a 
tran patience to hold the mirror”). 
of copyright to a control model” founded upon “this crazy but brilliant theory under which every 
unlicensed use of any work in digital form is potentially an infringement . . . [where] any act of  
reading or viewi
oduction.”). 
142 See, e.g., Hayes, supra note 50, at 63 (quoting RAYMOND T. NIMMER, INFORMATION LAW 
¶ 4.08[1], at 4-30 (1996)); see also LESSIG, supra note 135, at 99 (“This change in the scope of 
control came not from Congress deciding the copyright owner needed more control . . . .  
Technological changes dramatically increased, and the scope of con
right owners over the use of creative work increased dramatically.”). 
143 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp. (Cablevision I), 478 F. Supp. 
2d 607, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) rev’d in part, vacated in part sub nom., Cartoon Network, L.P. v. 
CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision II), 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that because the 
transient buffer copies automatically created by RS-DVR “are used to make permanent copies of 
entire programs” elsewhere in the RS-DVR system, they are “[c]learly . . . capable of be
ed,” and therefore are copies); see 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 20, at § 8.02[2
In order to constitute an infringing copy or phonorecord, the embodiment of the 
plaintiff’s work must be not only tangible (a ‘material object’); it must also be of 
some permanence.  These are two separable concepts, which are not necessarily 
wedded.  Writing in sand is tangible in form even if the next wave will erase it 
forever.  The image that appears on a
a material object, but is evanescent.  
 See also Pamela Samuelson, Legally Speaking: The NII Intellectual Property Report, 37 
COMM. OF THE ACM 21, 23 (1994) (explaining that by such logic, holding a mirror up to a book 
would constitute infringement “because the book’s image could be perceived there 
sitory duration, i.e., however long one has the 
144 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1479, at 53 (1976). 
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This lack of acknowledgment of a temporal requirement for the “fixed” 
definition stems from the precedent that perpetuated the RAM copy doctrine and 
which confused the meaning of “copy” and “fixed” used to determine if a work 
deserves copyright protection with “copy” in the infringement sense.145  “Copy” 
for the reproduction right defined in § 101 of the Copyright Act is concerned with 
distinguishing between the material object and the copyrighted work embedded 
therein.146  “Copy” for infringement analysis has been developed as a common 
law concept.147  These definitions are not coextensive.148  An infringing copy 
results from an unauthorized, temporally and economically material reproduction 
that is contained in a copy.149  The cases that developed the RAM copy doctrine 
which was followed in Cablevision I conflated the two “copy” definitions: “MAI 
Sys




ctions from which economic value can be derived. . . 
                                                                                                                                    
tems engaged in a semantic sleight of hand: The statutory definition of a 
material object became the definition of the statutory term for infringement—
reproduction . . . MAI
ically as it was revolutionary in its legal errors.”150 
 Copyright Office’s DMCA Report also does not account for the tem
ment of fixed:  
Congress intended the copyright owner’s exclusive right to extend 
to all reprodu
.  The dividing line, then, can be drawn between reproductions that 
exist for a sufficient period of time to be capable of being 
 













149 See id. § 9:63. 
d. Emphasizing that this flawed approach: 
has been followed in cases involving . . . most objectionably for the buffering 
and caching that occurs automatically as an incident to Internet or other digital
transmissions.  Arguments have been made in connection with RS-DVRs . . . 
where buffering is no more the making of an infringing copy than in an Internet 
context.  MAI Systems involved the deliberate creation of a shadow, viewable 
copy of an entire work used for diagnostic purposes. . . .  By contrast, cachin
and buffering is not hearable or viewable by consumers, usually consists of 
extremely small amounts of data, is a function of the manner in which digital 
transmissions occur rather than being a volitional act, and have no independ
economic value.  These facts take caching and buffering well outside MAI 
systems.  Yet, the allegation that buffering and caching represents an infringing
reproduction has served to retard severely lawful online distribution of music,
providing music publishers and record labels with undeserved windfalls and 
leverage i
efforts.   
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‘perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated’ and those that 
do not.”151   
The
 distinguished the facts to 
harmon to be 




ent is satisfied and where it fails will depend on the facts.  Currently, 
wit
applied the holding in Cablevision II to a case that had facts similar to MAI Sys. 
Cor rmining that the loading of copyrighted software programs into the 
RA
                                                                                                                                    
 foundations for the report rely on interpretations of MAI Systems Corp. and 
its subsequent endorsement by the National Information Infrastructure Task Force 
that all RAM data are copies within the reproduction right of the Act as long as 
they can be “perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated.152 
In Cablevision II, the Second Circuit properly
ize itself with precedent, and to enable the RAM copy doctrine 
 with the Copyright Act.  As a result, a RAM copy can be a copy but
automatically one.  This results from applying the two pro
ment and duration—of the fixed definition:   
Unless both requirements are met, the work is not “fixed” in the 
buffer, and, as a result, the buffer data is not a “copy” of the 
original work whose data is buffered . . . [W]e constr  
Systems and its progeny as holding that loading a program into a 
computer’s RAM can result in copying that program.  We do not 
read MAI Systems as holding that, as a matter of law, loading a 
program into a form of RAM always results in copying . . .153 
Therefore, the RAM copy doctrine does not negate the temporal requirement.  In 
MAI Sys. Corp., the temporal requirement was not an issue because the software 
was loaded into RAM and remained there for a matter of minutes.154  Yet, the 
courts provide no bright-line interpretation regarding the duration requirement.  
There is an infinite set of points between the 1.2 second duration found in MAI 
Sys. Corp., and a matter of minutes.  For instance, choosing where the temporal 
requirem
hout clear legislative direction, this non-bright-line, fact-driven temporality 
analysis seems to be an appropriate judicial stance that recognizes both 
requirements of the statutory language of the fixed requirements of copyrightable 
copies. 
Subsequently, the District Court for the Southern District of New York 
p. in dete
M of a computer constitutes a copy where it remains in the computer for 
 
d. 
 C 28 (2d Cir. 
2008). 
154 9
151 DMCA REPORT, supra note 78, at 110–12. 
152 See i
153 artoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision II), 536 F.3d 121, 1
91 F.2d 511, 517 (9th Cir. 1993). 
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minutes to hours.155  This holding that recognizes the two statutory requirements 
for a copyrightable copy demonstrates that imposing both embodiment and 
durational requirements harmonizes the Copyright Act with the RAM copy 
156
C. al 
author blic:  
 enactment which never contemplated such 
                                                                                                                                    
doctrine as established in MAI Systems Corp.   
A RAM Copy Doctrine that Incorporates Both an Embodiment and Tempor
Requirement for Fixation Upholds the Constitutional Copyright Mandate. 
To interpret the RAM copy doctrine as having both an embodiment and 
temporal requirement to be a copy not only finds more support in the text and 
legislative history of the Copyright Act, but also furthers the underlying purpose 
of copyright law, which is to “promote the science and the useful arts” as stated in 
the copyright clause of the U.S. Constitution.157  The primary purpose of 
copyright is to enrich the public by making creative works broadly available.  To 
achieve broad dissemination copyright law strikes a balance of rewarding an 
with a limited monopoly in her work before it is freely given to the pu
In a case like this, in which Congress has not plainly marked our 
course, we must be circumspect in construing the scope of rights 
created by a legislative
a calculus of interests: 
The limited scope of the copyright holder’s statutory monopoly, 
like the limited copyright duration required by the Constitution, 
reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public interest: 
Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private 
motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad 
public availability of literature, music, and the other arts.  The 
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for 
an ‘author’s’ creative labor.  But the ultimate aim is, by this 
incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public 
good.  ‘The sole interest of the United States and the primary 
object in conferring the monopoly,’ this Court has said, ‘lie in the 
general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors’. . 
 
155 See SimplexGrinnell LP v. Integrated Systems & Power, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 2d 167, 189 
(2009): 
The embodiment requirement is satisfied when a software program is loaded 
ould be satisfied where the program remained in RAM for at least 
r where the program remained in RAM until the computer is 
into a computer’s RAM . . . and Cartoon Network suggested that the duration 
requirement w
several minutes o
shut off . . . . 
156 See generally id. 
157 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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. .  When technological change has rendered its literal terms 
ambiguous, the Copyright Act must be construed in light of this 
basic purpose.158  
By applying the RAM copy doctrine without using the temporal analysis required 
for a copy to be fixed and copyrightable, copyright owners would garner greater 
control with regard to their work simply because of the buffering that is inherent 
in processing digital data.159  The reproduction right would expand to cover the 
act of simply looking at material.160  This would limit the reach of digital 
technology and deprive the public of an increased access to creative works.161  
Using both the embodiment and temporal requirement of the “fixed” definition 
gives greater deference to the e, and, in turn, promotes the 
pub
is esult undermines the Copyright Act’s policies 
and
                                                                                                                                    
statutory languag
lic’s access to works by not limiting digital technology simply because of its 
functionality. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In a world that has shifted from analog to digital technology, 1.2 seconds of 
digital data and three frames (0.1 second) of a television program that remain in 
the transitory buffers of Cablevision’s RS-DVR represent fleeting trifles, yet 
stand to assume the stature of a defining moment in copyright law.  In 
Cablevision I, the district court found the buffer data to be fixed, and, therefore, 
an infringing copy, noting that all digital devices use “transient data buffers, 
which are regions of memory that temporarily hold data.”162  The district court 
viewed its holding as a natural progression of MAI Sys. Corp. and subsequent 
cases that established data loaded into RAM is a copy.  However, the district 
court’s holding would greatly expand liability associated with the normal use of 
digital devices that function by making temporary buffer copies.  As a result, the 
public’s access and use of digital technology would be confined and limited 
simply by the threat inherent with the normal operation of a digital device as 
constituting infringement.  Th  r
 its constitutional mandate of promoting the “progress of science and useful 
 
158 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431–32 (1984) (quoting 
Twe  Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)). 
an, supra note 136, at 31–32. 
m., Cartoon Network, L.P. v. 
CSC 6 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008). 
ntieth Century Music
159 See generally id. 
160 See Litm
161 See id. 
162 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp. (Cablevision I), 478 F. Supp. 
2d 607, 613 (S.D.N.Y 2007) rev’d in part, vacated in part sub no
 Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision II), 53
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aded and used the software in MAI Sys. Corp. to the three 
fram
s of the lower courts highlight the growing tension 
affecting the interests at play concerning the Copyright Act and its purpose of 
promoting authors to create in order to enrich the public’s access to a greater 
number of these works, which, in turn, are increasingly being facilitated and 
delivered by digital means.166 
 
                                                                                                                                    
arts” by encouraging the proliferation of creative works and increasing the 
public’s access to these works.163 
In Cablevision II, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this holding 
by determining that these brief reproductions were not “fixed” and therefore not 
“copies” within the meaning of the Copyright Act.164  This holding merely 
distinguishes itself factually from MAI Sys. Corp. and purports that this precedent 
that established the RAM copy doctrine has always recognized a durational 
requirement for a copy to be fixed under the Copyright Act.  Although this 
decision appears to adhere to the statute, it does not create certainty.  From the 
minute the technician lo
es of television programming held in the primary ingest buffer of 
Cablevision’s RS-DVR system exists an infinite set of points where the duration 
requirement exists or falls short.  This ad hoc analysis is not strange to courts 
facing copyright issues.165 
The antithetical holding
 
163 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
164 Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision II), 536 F.3d 121, 130 (2d Cir. 
2008), cert denied, Cable News Network, Inc. v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision III), 129 S. Ct. 
985 (2009). 
165 See, e.g., Nichols v. Universal Pictures, 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d. Cir. 1930) (discussing the 
difficulty in determining what is protectable expression and what is non-protectable idea and that 
previous court decisions cannot provide a holding applicable to subsequent cases). 
166 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 510 U.S. 569, 
575 (1994); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431–32 (1984) 
(quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)). 
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